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Abstract 
NASA is investigating the use of advanced automation to enhance crew productivity for Space 
Station Freedom in numerous areas, one being failure management. This paper describes a 
prototype that diagnoses failure sources and assesses the future impacts of those failures on other 
Freedom entities. 
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Introduction 
This paper addresses the application of Artificial Intelligence (AI) techniques to failure diagnosis 
and impact assessment. The Diagnostic Reasoner (DR) is an existing prototype that accepts 
qualitative status reports that reflect significant changes detected by subordinate systems, 
determines the likely sources of failures, and projects the impacts of those failures onto other 
Freedom entities. The DR uses AI techniques such as pattern matching, symbolic reasoning, and 
model-based reasoning to produce a diagnosis to either confirm or correct the subordinate systems' 
diagnoses. 
Background 
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is in the process of designing and 
implementing a permanently manned space station, Space Station Freedom, to be put into low earth 
orbit. In support of Johnson Space Center's (JSC) Automation and Robotics Division, MITU is 
developing a proof-of-concept failure management prototype that demonstrates the use of expert 
system software to assist the onboard crew via decision support in recovering from failures in a 
dynamically changing, controlled environment. (Baker, 1990) 
Space Station Freedom has been defined to have a hierarchical, distributed command and control 
architecture. The highest level, or Tier I, in the architecture is concerned with global, vehicle-wide 
issues, and includes automated and manual operations, both on the ground and onboard. Onboard 
Tier I functions include the failure management function. Tier I entities have knowledge of each of 
the systems and elements, and how these interact. Tier I1 entities are systems delineated along 
functional boundaries, such as the Electrical Power System. Each Tier I1 entity is controlled by a 
Tier I1 manager that has knowledge about its own status, but not of the other Tier I1 entities. With 
no direct knowledge of other Tier II entities, each Tier I1 manager produces and reports dynamic 
97 
LANK NOT ~ I L ~ ~  
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19910013464 2020-03-19T17:57:59+00:00Z
data representing the current status and configuration of its components to Tier I for a global 
assessment of the enterprise as a whole. (NASA, 1989) 
The failure management prototype described comprises two components: the DR diagnoses and 
analyzes the failure; the Recovery Expert (Rx) formulates sets of possible actions to take (Courses 
of Action) for recovery. The DR and the Rx act at the Tier I level for failure diagnosis and 
recovery. This article describes the D R  a companion article (Hammen, 1991) focuses on the Rx. 
The DR and the Rx are not completely automated functions, but are computerized decision aids in 
which the user is provided interaction capabilities throughout the failure management process. 
We adhere to the significant architecture requirements imposed by Freedom's environment, as we 
hope to influence Freedom's design with our approach. In particular, the prototypes rely on the 
existence of hierarchical, distributed management functions. Constraints placed on the prototypes 
shape the architecture of the software, but do not limit its usefulness to Freedom or to space-related 
domains. This software can be used in other domains without changing the computational portion 
of the application, instead changing only the data that describe the environment. 
The technologies used in the implementation of the failure management prototype are model-based 
reasoning (the DR) (Davis, 1984) and goal-directed planning (the Rx). The objective of the 
prototype is to show how we use these technologies, and how the technologies work together 
synergistically using the same knowledge representation for both the DR and the Rx. The purpose 
of developing this prototype is to address a new approach to the problem, to apply advanced 
technologies to it, to examine all aspects of failure management in one integrated application, and to 
do this in a general way so that the same technology can be used in other domains. The prototype 
was developed on VAXstationm 3100 workstations under VMSm, using ARTm/Ada and TAE 
PlusTM. 
Figure 1 shows an overview of the environment in which the DR and the Rx prototypes operate. 
The DR receives Tier I1 reports of significant, qualitative changes. The DR identifies the suspected 
causes of the failure, and determines the current and possible future impacts these suspected 
failures are likely to cause on other Freedom entities. Once the DR has diagnosed the problem and 
determined the immediate and downstream effects and impacts of the failure, the Rx uses this 
information to formulate solutions, or Courses of Action, for recovery. Each Course of Action 
deals not only with the immediate problem, but also determines what actions to take to mitigate the 
constraints imposed by the failure. The Procedures Interpreter, an earlier prototype not described 
in this paper, executes the pre-defined procedures identified in the selected Course of Action, 
resulting in commands to the Tier I1 managers. The effects of these commands on the Tier I1 
systems is, in turn, reported to the DR as changes in status or configuration, thereby closing the 
loop between Tier I and II. 
DR Overview 
The DR is responsible for determining the likely sources of a failure, and projecting the future 
impacts of the failure on the rest of the station. The DR uses status reports from the Tier I1 
managers along with structural and behavioral data contained in the Component Model to generate 
lists of suspects that might be responsible for the failure. These Suspect Lists are updated, 
merged, and deleted to show the current reasoning of the DR. For each suspect identified, the DR 
98 
Plan Generation ~ 
Data 
Diagnosis, 
... 
Tier II 
TCS Status 
and 
Configuration 
Figure 1. Overview of the DR/Rx Process Flow 
uses the Impact Model to assess and project the immediate and future impacts of the failure onto 
other Freedom entities. The suspects and the assessment of their impacts, or Impact Sequences, 
are passed to the Rx for generation of appropriate Courses of Action for recovery. A high level 
diagram of the DR processing is shown in Figure 2. 
The Tier I1 managers report significant changes to Tier I. A significant change occurs when the 
state of some component crosses a qualitative assessment boundary (for example, a component 
changes from a "nominal" state to a "failed" state, or from a "failed" state to a "nominal" state). In 
order to determine if there is a significant change, the Tier II manager must assess and evaluate the 
operational data that it directly monitors. The data that Tier I1 reports to Tier I represent a 
qualitative assessment of the system components. The directly-measured quantitative data are also 
available to Tier I on request. 
The DR receives the Tier I1 reports, and reflects the information in the Component Model, a 
schematic-like model of the enterprise containing information about both the structure of the 
enterprise and the expected behavior (and known possible misbehaviors) of the components. If the 
reports received by the DR indicate a failure, the DR determines possible causes of the failure by 
searching the Component Model for defined causes of observed misbehaviors. The conclusions 
drawn by the DR are placed in the Suspect Lists. For each suspect identified, the DR uses the 
99 
Tier II keports 
Figure 2. Diagnostic Reasoner Processing 
Impact Model to determine the immediate and possible subsequent impacts, and expresses them as 
a cascade of cause and effect in an Impact Sequence. 
Once the DR has diagnosed the problem and determined the immediate and downstream effects, the 
Rx formulates alternative plans for recovery using the Suspect Lists and Impact Sequences. 
Externally Visible Data 
The DR either corrects or confirms Tier I1 diagnoses by updating and using data in the Component 
Model and the Impact Model. Both these models incorporate an element of time to cope with the 
dynamic environment. The DR diagnoses, which include both the suspected causes of the failures 
and the Impact Sequences, are placed in Suspect Lists. We describe the relative time representation 
and these four data types in this section. 
Relative Time Representation 
The prototypes are expected to operate in a dynamically-changing environment, where the state of 
the vehicle changes with time. Timing and temporal relationships among detected events, projected 
future events, and planned activities are very important to the functioning of the prototypes. The 
problem is not how to express the specific time at which detected events have occurred (an absolute 
representation of time), but rather how to express the relative time frame in which future events are 
expected to occur: this is a matter of timing rather than time. 
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Figure 3. Logarithmic Representation of ReIative Timing. 
We express relative time on a logarithmic scale of seconds, chunking the time into discrete integral 
intervals. Figure 3 illustrates this use of time intervals. One example of using this scale is the 
expression of timing between some event and the expected impact to be felt as a result. If the 
timing information has a value of 0, the impact is expected to be felt within a maximum of ten 
seconds. If the timing information has a value of 2, the impact should be felt in 100 to 1000 
seconds. 
Component Model 
The Component Model, a schematic-like representation of the space station and its components, is 
at the heart of both the DR and the Rx processing. The Component Model incorporates structural, 
behavioral, and status information. The structural information identifies each individual 
component’s relationships with other components, both physically and functionally. The behavior 
information identifies, for each type or class of component, the causes and effects of particular 
conditions with respect to that component type’s health and mode of operation. The behavior 
information describes both internal causal consequences and behaviors across component 
boundaries. The status information identifies, for each individual component that is operating, the 
current operational values related to the component’s mode of operation, equipment health, and key 
operational values that are related to behavior. 
Figure 4 illustrates three types of inter-component relationships expressed in the Component 
Model. Locality relationships give information regarding the position in the space station in which 
components are physically located. Resource Supply and Demand relationships show the 
functional inter-component dependencies. Note the links between these representations: for 
example, Node 1 Aft Rack 1 is defined in the Locality relationships and referred to in the Resource 
Supply and Demand relationships. Resource Supply and Demand relationships show how 
individual components are functionally aggregated to provide high-level capabilities. Func-tional 
Connectivity relationships show how the individual components are physically linked together. 
Figure 5 illustrates the hierarchical nature of the systems’ representation, using the Thermal Con- 
trol System (TCS) and Communication and Tracking System (C&T) as examples. This represen- 
tation also encompasses information about characteristics of the components (shown in more detail 
in Figure 6).  Connections between the Levels (0, 1 ,2  and 3) show the inheritance pathway in the 
Component Model. At the lowest level in the figure, the instantiation of specific components is 
shown, where each component class is likely to have many individual instantiations. 
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The description of a specific component’s behavior and characteristics is based on the generic 
description of a class of related components; the class description, in turn, is defined as a hierarchy 
of descriptions. The description of a class of components includes descriptions of types of 
relationships with other components, component behavior causes and effects, and attribute 
definitions for status information. The values for the status information includes the specific 
behavior measures and operating conditions of each individual component. 
Figure 6 elaborates on a subset of the behavior infomation for the specific Component class Cold 
Plate. This information is expressed at Level 3 of the hierarchy as shown in Figure 5. Behavior 
information for a component type is expressed as a cause-and-effect model for possible observed 
behaviors. In Figure 6,  for example, two possible causes for a cold plate to exhibit a low flow rate 
are “Upstream Entity Flow Rate Low”, or “Internal Failure”. Upstream Entity is an abstraction 
that is instantiated for the specific component instances using information extracted from 
Functional Connectivity relationships (Figure 4(c)). Figure 7 illustrates the d y n d c  operational 
values related to measurements of behavior for a component instance. This type of representation 
is repeated for each component in the Component Model. 
Cold Plate 15 
,.. 
temperature 
value value value 
degraded low high 
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Figure 7. Cold Plate Instantiation. ’ 
A Suspect List identifies a set of related observed (off-nominal) behavior attribute values and those 
components whose off-nominal performance could result in those obskrvations. Figure 8 shows 
the structure of a Suspect List. 
A Suspect List is associated with a specific failure. When diagnosing a failure,, the same failure 
situation might be explained by more than one possible cause; that is, one failure situation can yield 
more than one possible diagnosis. In this case, the DR generates a single Suspect List containing 
several Suspect Groups, each group providing a different explanation for the same failure. In 
some cases, a single component may not be the cause of failure. A set of observable behaviors 
resulting from multiple component failures may be jointly responsible for the failure. In this event, 
the DR lists all of the components as a possible cause in a single Suspect Group. 
A Suspect List also can identify key unknown behavioral measures: operational behavior measures 
whose value is not available directly. The assessment of some behavioral measurks will require 
special resources (e.g., asking an astronaut to execute a procedure to collect data) or will induce 
inter-system interactions (e.g., taking a component offline to perform diagnostics). When the DR 
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encounters one of these unknown measures along one of its diagnostic pathways, it posts the 
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Figure 8, Suspect List Structure 
For each Suspect Group in the Suspect List, the DR adds likelihood and believability values, as 
well as impact severity values and an Impact Sequence. Likelihood indicates how likely it is that 
the Suspect Group caused the failure: for example, a component that fails frequently is more likely 
to be the cause than one that fails rarely. Believability indicates how reliable the data are that are 
used to determine the Suspect Group as the cause of failure: for example, some sensors are known 
to frequently fail or be unreliable. The impact severity value is an indication of the severity of the 
failure based on the severity of projected consequences. This value is used by the Rx to determine 
whether a recovery Course of Action is generated for that suspect for safety's sake, regardless of 
the likelihood that it really is the source of the failure. 
Impact Model 
The Impact Model is used to predict the cascade of effects that are expected to result from a specific 
failure type, or Impact Sequence. The Impact Model contains information much like that needed 
by a person to formulate Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) trees. This 
includes, for each system in the enterprise, and for each component in each system, the 
relationships between each component's failure modes and the effects of those failures with respect 
to each system operating mode as well as the operational requirements of those modes. These data 
provide the basis for determining the effect of the failure on the entire enterprise with respect to the 
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time of the failure's occurrence, the component's as well as the system's operating mode at that 
time, and the particular set of operational requirements against which the effect of the failure must 
be assessed. (Ireson, 1988) 
The Impact Model focuses on the immediate and near-term future operational causes and effects. 
The data contained in this model is partitioned into sections, where one section expresses one type 
of cause-and-effect sequence. Each cause-and-effect sequence contains information such as the 
failure type, the component or function class affected by or involved in the failure, the failure type 
expected to appear as a result of the failure, the component(s) or function(s) to which the failure 
type is expected to propagate, a heuristically assigned severity value for the failure type, and the 
temporal aspects of the failure. For a specific failure, these sequences are instantiated and linked 
together, based on the current configuration of the enterprise. 
Figure 9 provides an illustration of a portion of the Impact Model: the Impaired Operations of the 
Active Thermal Control System (ATCS) failure type. One cause-and-effect sequence is associated 
with this failure type (Le., a Reduced Resource Supply in the ATCS cooling); however, the model 
structure can support multiple effects. Again, aspects of the model are represented symbolically 
(e.g., ATCS Cooling-Location), and must be instantiated for specific failures. 
Impaired Operations 
ATCS Cooling - Location 
Impairment Amount 
Reduced Resource Supply 
ATCS Cooling - Location / J \  Reduction = Impairment Always 
True Immediate 
Figure 9. Impact Model Example 
Impact Sequence 
The Impact Sequence expresses the cascade of immediate and subsequent effects seen as the resuIt 
of a particular failure. The concept is similar to that of the FMECA, expressed in the following 
example from the seventeen-century of a component failure that resulted in catastrophic failure: 
"For want of a nail the shoe was lost, for want of a shoe the horse was lost, for want of a horse the 
rider was lost ..." and so goes the cascade of subsequent effects of a minor failure in the 
communication system until, at last, the kingdom was lost. (Ireson, 1988) 
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Figure 10. Impact Sequence 
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The Impact Sequence is a tree-like structure constructed by starting with a root cause (e.g., 
Equipment Malfunction), examining it in the given situation, and linking together the causes and 
effects as they apply to situation. As with FMECA work, it is not feasible to identify and control 
every failure in every system with the potential for catastrophic effects; rather, the objective of the 
Impact Sequence is to provide a sound basis (to the RX) for guiding the allocation of resources 
such that the probability catastrophic failure is reduced as much as possible. (Ireson, 1988) 
Figure 10 illustrates an Impact Sequence. 
The DR Processing 
The following sections describe the DR processing, as illustrated in Figure 2, using the preceding 
data descriptions. 
Updating the Component Model 
The Tier I1 managers notify the DR of changes in the both the status and configuration of system 
components through system reports. Only significant qualitative changes (for example, a cold 
plate's temperature changing from "nominal" to "hot") are reported to the DR minor quantitative 
deviations are not. The DR uses the information in the system reports to update the Component 
Model. 
Identifying Suspects 
When the system reports indicate a problem, the DR searches for suspected causes using the 
reported status and the modeled behavioral cause-and-effect. Once a suspect is identified, it is 
placed as a Suspect Group within a Suspect List. If the DR identifies a multiple source failure, the 
Suspect Group will contain more than one suspect. After a suspect is identified, the DR verifies 
that the expected behavioral effects have occurred with respect to the suspect(s) and their related 
components in the expected time frame. This process is repeated until no new suspects can be 
identified. 
For each Suspect Group, a likelihood value, which incorporates two factors, is assigned. The first 
factor considers how likely the Suspect Group is to be the cause of the failure, taking into account 
the component's failure rate. The second considers the likelihood that a multi-component Suspect 
Group is the cause of the failure. A believability value, also assigned to each Suspect Group, is an 
assessment of how much belief is given to the information from the systems. Suspect Groups 
containing component known to have sensors that produce unreliable values listed as the cause will 
have a low believability. The inclusion of a believability value for a Suspect Group was driven by 
the fact that false sensor readings have been a problem in previous space programs. 
The DR uses modeled component misbehaviors to identify suspects. The drawback of this 
technique is that diagnoses are limited to predefined known failures in the component model. If a 
component fails in a mode that is not in its modeled misbehaviors, the DR cannot explain the 
failure properly. These unanticipated failures will be diagnosed either as multiple failures of related 
components or as conflicts in expected component behaviors. Conflicts between the observed 
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component behavior and the expected modeled behavior will alert the DR to notify the user that 
some form of unmodeled misbehavior is taking place. 
Other model-base diagnosis techniques that use nominal component behavior are not as limited in 
their isolation of failures because they look for conflicts between a model of the nominal system 
and the observed behaviors (Davis, 1988; Holtzblatt, 1989). These techniques are not currently 
used by the DR because they require detailed knowledge for each component, with a concomitant 
increase in the amount of processing power required to perform a diagnosis on a complex system. 
This is especially a problem when diagnosing multiple failures. It is also very difficult to build a 
detailed model to use these techniques for something as complex as an entire space station. The 
use of nominal behavior in high-level models to diagnosis failures will be an area of future research 
for the DR. 
Using the Cold Plate example, if the Thermal Control System reports that a specific Cold Plate’s 
outgoing temperature is high, the DR looks for possible causes to explain this behavior in a cold 
plate. The modeled behavior shows that a Cold Plate’s high outgoing temperature could be caused 
by an internal failure, a low flow rate, the upstream entity having a high outgoing temperature, or a 
cooled component’s temperature being high. As an example, if the DR sees that the observed flow 
rate for this specific cold plate is low, it searches the behavioral information in the Component 
Model for an observed behavior that causes a low flow rate. Once a root cause (suspect) is 
identified for the high outgoing temperature, the DR assigns this suspect to a Suspect Group within 
a Suspect List. The DR then checks the operational data to see if the other effects from that root 
cause have occurrd in the predicted time frarne. If they have not been observed and sufficient time 
has elapsed, the DR places a lower believability on that Suspect Group. Next, the DR assigns a 
likelihood to the Suspect Group, based on what operational reliability parameters are available for 
the suspect. This same process is repeated until all the components whose failure mode might 
cause Cold Plate 15’s outgoing temperature to be high are identified and placed as Suspect Groups 
in the Suspect List. 
Managing the Suspect List 
The Tier I1 managers do not observe all of the effects of a failure at the same time. Consequently, 
the DR will generate Suspect Lists without complete knowledge of the problem. When the DR 
receives the first system report, the DR responds given the available information and generates an 
initial Suspect List. As additional information becomes available, rather than building a completely 
new Suspect List, the DR first determines if the new information is related to an already-existing 
Suspect List. The DR relies on the expected behavioral causes and effects of identified suspects 
that are described in the Component Model to update, merge, or delete existing Suspect Lists 
generated as the result of the same failure. This yields new Suspect Lists which reflect the latest 
information available to the DR. 
In the Cold Plate example, an initial report from the Thermal Control System may tell the DR that 
Cold Plate 15 has a low flow rate. The DR places Cold Plate 15 in an initial Suspect List. Later, 
the Communications and Tracking System might tell the DR that High Data Rate Frame Multiplexer 
2 has overheated and failed. The DR notes that the High Data Rate Frame Multiplexer is cooled by 
Cold Plate 15, based on the Resource Supply and Demand relationships and Locality relationships 
in the Component Model; however, at present, there is no indication that Cold Plate 15 is 
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overheated or will overheat. Consequently, the DR creates a second Suspect List to explain the 
High Data Rate Frame Multiplexer failure. Finally, the Thermal Control System reports to the DR 
that Cold Plate 15's outgoing temperature is high. Based on behavioral information in the 
Component Model, the DR finds that a low flow rate in a Cold Plate causes a high outgoing 
temperature in a Cold Plate, and that high outgoing temperature causes the components cooled by 
that particular Cold Plate to overheat. The DR relates the two failures, and merges the two Suspect 
Lists into one with the root cause being Cold Plate 15's low flow rate. 
Generating the Impact Sequence 
The DR generates an Impact Sequence for each Suspect Group in a Suspect List. By instantiating 
the appropriate cause-and-effect sequences in the Impact Model, the DR dynamically constructs the 
cascade of effects expected to result with time from a given failure situation. The Impact Sequence 
is a tree-like structure made up of nodes, where the root node is an instantiation of the cause-and- 
effect sequence type related to the failure identified in the Suspect Group. Each node in the cascade 
of nodes to follow is also an instantiation of cause-and-effect sequence types that propagate from 
the effect identified in the particular node's parent. 
The DR also attaches a severity value and an element of time to each node using severity and 
temporal factors in the Impact Model. The generation of the Impact Sequence is bounded by an 
envelope of time and severity. Given enough time, the most insignificant failure might become 
quite severe. Since we assume that no such failure will go unattended for a period of time 
sufficient to become a severe problem, the DR bounds the Impact Sequence generation by time. 
Similarly, generation is bounded by severity in that the DR projects the cascade of effects up to 
some predetermined severity value. 
Conclusions 
We completed the design of the DR and the Rx, and are currently demonstrating the first, stand- 
alone release of the DR and the Rx. Based on experience with this prototyping effort, which 
includes the DR and the Rx as well as earlier efforts from which the DR and the Rx evolved 
(Kelly, 1988; Kelly, 1989; Marsh 1989), we learned lessons in technology transition, software 
reuse, and prototype software life cycles. 
The primary goal of the work represented by this series of prototypes is to influence Freedom's 
design and implementation. Its longer-term goal is to find other domains in which this technology 
and approach can be used. Both are aspects of technology transition (bringing technology 
innovations into operational use). 
Failure management is a process that is needed in many domains. The kinds of problems we are 
solving, and the approach we are taking to solve them, are very general. We are designing the 
failure managment prototype to be useable in domains beyond space operations. Examples of 
other possible applicable domains are NASA's manned Mars mission, chemical processing plants, 
or nuclear power plants. 
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With respect to future plans for the DR and the Rx, the two independently functioning applications 
will be integrated to function cooperatively. We will also integrate the DR/Rx with PI. For the 
commands that PI issues to be followed, the prototype must be integrated with a simulation 
environment for Space Station Freedom systems. We are investigating the possibility of 
developing our own simulations of the systems on a machine linked to our development 
workstations to provide a more portable demonstration capability. 
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